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Abstract: It will be argued that personal agency, 
far from lacking epistemic value, contributes to 
knowledge in a substantial way. To this end, it 
will be claimed that what Sosa calls an epistemic 
perspective is necessary to solve the binding 
problem in epistemology at the three junctures 
at which it can occur: as the Pyrrhonian question 
of whether one can rationally endorse one’s 
epistemic rationality; as the problem of the 
epistemic status of guessing; and as the enquiry 
into the contribution of the agential perspective 
for evading coincidental luck. Our aim has been 
that of elucidating and expanding Sosa’s virtue 
perspectivism.
Keywords: Coincidental Luck, Epistemic 
Perspective, Ernest Sosa, Guessing, Knowledge, 
Virtue Perspectivism.
Resumen: Se argumentará que, lejos de carecer 
de valor epistémico, la agencia personal contri-
buye a la explicación del conocimiento. Para ello, 
se mostrará que lo que Sosa denomina perspec-
tiva epistémica es imprescindible para la solución 
del problema de la unidad del conocimiento en 
las tres formas en las que éste puede plantearse: 
como el problema pirrónico respecto a la valida-
ción de los principios básicos de la racionalidad 
epistémica; como la pregunta acerca del estatus 
epistémico de la adivinación; y como la cuestión 
sobre qué papel podría desempeñar la perspectiva 
agencial en la superación de la suerte coincidente. 
Nuestros objetivos son los de elucidar y ampliar 
el perspectivismo de virtudes de Sosa. 
Palabras clave: Adivinación, Conocimiento, 
Ernest Sosa, Perspectiva epistémica, Perspecti-
vismo de virtudes, Suerte coincidente. 
1. Introduction
While virtue perspectivism has been widely associated with Sosa’s bi-level epistemology 
and it is common knowledge that the notion of epistemic perspective plays a crucial role 
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within Sosa’s model, both the specific normative aspect inherent to having an epistemic 
perspective and the existential tasks to which such perspective is related—the integration of 
our sensuous and intelligible natures; the overcoming of the cognitively divided self— have 
usually been ignored by interpreters. As it has been neglected the compatibilist (and, thus, 
the non-naturalist) view that lies behind Sosa’s overall project —one according to which 
knowledge is an appearance within nature that is at the same time freely produced by the 
agent, to wit, a rational phenomenon within the sensible world such that it provides us with 
a warrant for postulating the unity of freedom, rationality and nature. 
In Judgment and Agency, Sosa (2015) distinguishes between an instance of judgment, on 
the one hand, and merely having a belief, on the other. On this view, it is possible for the 
epistemic agent to experience an attraction to a particular seeming without at the same time 
willing to affirm that seeming. This view is in keeping with Sosa’s emphasis on explaining 
knowledge in terms of rational agency, as well as with his overall project to offset “an 
excessive focus on functional belief” (Sosa, Forthcoming, 11) by giving a proper place in 
epistemology to those dispositions that are “seated in the will.” (Sosa, 2015, 210)
Granted that by reflection the agent tears himself away from momentary drives and 
makes himself independent of sub-personal seemings, it is of the greatest significance that 
this process does not lead to cognitive disintegration, in which the agent is torn between 
the claims of reason and the urges of nature. Moreover, it is most important to provide an 
explanation of how it is possible for the agent to appropriate the deliverances of functional 
competences for himself and relate to himself in such appropriation. The integration of 
functional competences and rationality in Sosa’s conception of knowledge is carried out in 
his account of fully apt performance as willed appropriation of the sub-personal performance 
in accord with the intentional purpose that the agent pursues through his free affirmation. 
However, under penalty of blocking the understanding of free acts and making them random 
and arbitrary acts, this account requires a further integration of rationality and willing. The 
question is how it is possible to have a free judgment that is not eo ipso irrational.
A second challenge for bi-level epistemologies such as Sosa’s proposal is to show how 
voluntary judgments contribute to explaining knowledge. This challenge has been forcefully 
raised by Hilary Kornblith (2012). Kornblith makes two main criticisms of reflective 
knowledge. On the one hand, he is most emphatic on the point that reflection (getting an 
epistemic perspective) does not improve the reliability of first-order competences, thus 
suggesting that agency has no epistemic value.1 On the other hand, he worries about whether 
reflective knowledge is nothing but animal knowledge on top of animal knowledge, thus 
jeopardizing the distinction in kinds between animal and human knowledge. 
Let me waive Kornblith’s point on reflection and first-order reliability and focus on 
the problem of the epistemic value bestowed by agency. As we shall see shortly, cognitive 
performances that are set into motion —explicitly or implicitly— by the will possess an 
epistemic standing far superior to that of functional performances. This is because the impulse 
towards execution bestowed by the will confers a robust unity to the performance and, in so 
doing, provides a common cause and a unitary explanation to the act of judging and the aptness 
1 On Kornblith’s view, the value of agency is parasitical on the value of intellectual autonomy, the latter being an 
“extra-epistemic value.” (Kornblith, 2012, 34)
119Virtue Perspectivism, Normativity, and the Unity of Knowledge
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, nº 75 (Septiembre-Diciembre) 2018
of such judgment. The will is both an executive power and the seat of competences. Deprived 
of such common cause, first-order apt beliefs are merely the intersection of two independent 
causal chains and are thus coincidental. By removing a variety of luck as important as usually 
neglected, it is far from true that agency does not contribute to knowledge.
Let me add that, as the will is a spontaneous power that is responsive to reasons, 
full knowledge is not just more animal knowledge on top of animal knowledge. For one 
thing, the will is an active power of self-determination that explains the agent’s transition 
from indeterminacy to a determinate state. As such, judgments, unlike seemings, are not 
determined by causal processes external to the will itself. To be sure, free judgments require 
an explanation. But, since free acts cannot be explained in a way that makes them unfree, 
event causation is not the kind of explanation appropriate for this task. Besides, that the will 
operates in the light of reasons does not mean that reasons are —or can be— the causes (in 
a Humean sense) of decisions. Unlike causes, which determine happenings, reasons justify 
and guide deeds.2 Since judgments are actions and, as such, are not events that result from 
passive processes, the way in which they are related to reasons cannot be modelled on the 
way in which successful performances are related to reliable mechanisms. It is not only 
that the will is instrumental to the search of reasons but also that rational determination is 
self-determination. As we shall see, even in those cases in which judgments are performed 
in the face of no contrary reason, reasons are not limitations of the will.
The considerations of the previous paragraph are not intended to be decisive on the question 
of whether there is genuine rational agency. Their purpose is merely to show that there is no 
middle ground between a complete eliminativism with regard to reflective knowledge and the 
conception of reflective knowledge as knowledge that differs in kind from animal knowledge. 
It is just not possible to conserve agential reflection while depriving it of the features that 
make it different from animal knowledge. This is why, in my view, Kornblith’s proposal is 
an unstable halfway house. Eliminativism, on the other hand, comes with a cost. As it was 
suggested, eliminativism runs the risk of making of fluke successes instances of knowledge.
Here is the plan. In section 2, I will note some analogies and disanalogies between practical 
and cognitive reason. It is part of my aim here to argue that the epistemic, rational perspective is 
grounded on a higher-order purpose of the agent such that epistemic agency, far from improving 
on nature by aiming at the same goals, is constituted by ends different from the teleological 
purposes of first-order powers. Such unifying purpose introduces a qualitative dimension that 
makes possible the full and free appropriation of the functional. In section 3, the Kantian 
question is raised as to how the agent can freely appropriate his basic rational commitments 
without an arbitrary choice. The problem is that of how rational self-determination —in a 
2 Intentions and other mental acts and states that involve the consideration of reasons can clearly be causes —as 
these are understood in event causation—of doings, as in the case that Davidson considers of the climber who 
is caused to lose his hold on another man by being unnerved by his intention to rid himself of the extra weight 
(Davidson, 2001, 79). However, it stands to reason that it is the very fact that in such cases the agent does not 
freely decide to act according to reasons that explains why the effect is not an action. The agent is rational 
insofar as he is not compelled by a belief. By acting in the light of reasons, the agent is not caused to act by 
a psychological state. The intractable problem of deviant causation that plagues causal theories of action is 
indicative of a category mistake between psychological states (and the causal chains that relate them) and their 
intentional contents (and how they relate to the free subject and his acts). Although the will is a causal power, it 
is not a power the operations of which are themselves caused. 
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substantive, and not merely in a formal sense— is possible at all. Sosa has faced this issue on 
several occasions, mostly in his reflections on Pyrrhonism and on whether it is possible for 
the subject to be freely committed to irrationality. We will follow his lead to clarify how the 
epistemic perspective can itself be rationally validated. Finally, in section 4, the robust unity 
that voluntary judgment confers to epistemic performances will be developed. Agency will thus 
be shown to be a necessary constituent of knowledge. This article thus aims at addressing the 
ontological underpinnings of knowledge in a way that makes explicit the agential requirements 
of knowledge and further elucidates the contents and significance of virtue perspectivism. 
2. Formal Epistemic Agency
It is intuitive to distinguish an agent’s power for determining oneself to act from having one’s 
doings imposed by external causes. However, a voluntary action —one that the agent can rightly 
claim as his own— is not the result of only a spontaneous power that operates independently 
of triggers as with the spontaneous decay of uranium. Exercises of the will are uncaused but 
also responsive to reasons. Reasons operate, however, in view of feasible purposes. Could those 
purposes be freely and rationally followed so that one’s actions would be governed by ends 
(and norms) that are in turn freely determined by the will? The question is whether full, rational 
self-determination is even possible and whether the agent, as an agent, is more than the manager 
of his natural drives. How, if at all, could one integrate the ends of nature within a human 
cognitive life, a life that ranges well beyond successful and even apt epistemic performances?
In order to shed some light on this problem, it is important to start with the minimal 
conditions for a free performance. At a minimum, agency requires a power (the will) that is 
never determined by drives, even in those cases where the subject acts in accordance with the 
dominant drive. To act freely, the subject has at least to determine himself to follow the urge, 
making himself independent of it. It is by consciously aiming at an end —by subsuming 
natural impulses under a unifying purpose— that the agent determines himself, thus freely 
choosing among the various incentives of which he is aware. This is why Sosa identifies the 
region of freedom with the domain of endeavours (Sosa, 2015, 192), and why, to be free 
(and not merely random), a decision has to be grounded on the goals in the endeavour of 
which the agent acts. Self-determination thus institutes a means-end structure that operates 
as the standard on the basis of which rational behaviour is made possible. When actively 
pursuing his ends in the process of making a decision, the agent weighs different courses of 
action in view of achieving his goal. It is by aligning his action with the dictates of reason 
that the agent’s performances become free and rational, however his awareness may be 
limited or deceptive. It is then the purpose to which the action is directed —and to which 
deeds are necessarily anchored— that makes the action neither blind nor arbitrary. As was 
to be expected, the agent’s liberty is made more salient (although it may not be increased) 
in cases in which the ego experiences conflict between impulses and reasons.
However, the previous considerations are limited to the area of prudential rationality, 
meaning that the ends to which the performances of practical agents are directed are usually 
taken from nature, in complete disregard of their origins and rational standing. Thus, the 
agent imposes a veto on certain drives and impulses in order to pursue more long-standing 
and valuable natural interests, as when one holds a check on appetites in view of improving 
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one’s health or prolonging one’s life. One could thus say that the monitoring agent produces 
a totality out of the often chaotic and conflicting multiplicity of impulses in the endeavour 
of better achieving natural ends and fulfilling natural needs. The subject appropriates the 
ends of nature by taking control of his nature. In this sense, he is playing the part of nature 
as well as improving on it. It is thus difficult to see how the agent can be something more 
than a manager of his impulses. The worry is whether on this view the free, rational subject 
is not reduced to a vehicle through which nature’s ends are better acquired and expressed. 
This worry finds several related expressions in the literature of agency. Nozick expresses it 
by contrasting the contributory and the originative values of actions (Nozick, 1981, 311-312), 
where the latter value, far from consisting —unlike the former— in the value that an action 
possesses insofar as it helps realize a natural end, lies in the fact that the action introduces a 
new end into the world. It is, however, within the Kantian tradition where this point is most 
emphatic. On the one hand, it is expressed in the search of norms that in the case of conflict, 
would always trump any other purpose. These guiding principles would produce such firm 
conviction in the agent that —according to the felicitous words of Fichte— he “accepts the risk 
of not being able to alter either his manner of acting or the principles in according with which 
he is acting in this manner.” (Fichte, 2005, 160) On the other hand, it is disclosed through the 
aspiration towards universal rules capable of governing agents independently of who they are, 
the interests by which they are motivated, and how they are situated or physically constituted. 
These would be the practical norms —and purposes— of agents insofar as they are agents. 
In the domain of practical rationality, the preceding remarks come to mark the transition 
from prudential behaviour to morality. Let us bear in mind three important points that will 
be shortly developed. For one, the higher-order norm that governs the actions of full agents 
is supposed to confer a higher consistency to the will and, in doing so, to make possible a 
closer unity between the agent and his actions so that the former, by recognizing his deeds 
as genuinely his own, would be fully committed to them. It is, therefore, as if overcoming 
prudential rationality would be required for the crystallization of a robust, fully responsible self. 
This means, in the second place, that on this view, the emphasis is shifted from acts that 
manifest one’s liberty to abstain from an impulse to decisive actions where what is at stake is the 
very integrity of the rational self, which is tested. It is as if, from a higher standpoint, practical 
ends —and the results of practical deliberations— were tinged with a certain indifference and 
tolerated inasmuch as conflicts with conscience do not arise. Although they are not blind, 
quotidian acts would thus constitute an intermediate region between the passive and the fully 
active, where the agent neither takes full responsibility for his doings nor is as wholly committed 
to them as to accept the risk of making them irrevocably. As it so happens, this perspective 
presupposes a care for oneself as a moral agent that stands apart from prudential self-caring, to 
the point of instituting duties that, if unfulfilled, plague the self with regrets wholly independent 
of whether practical success is achieved. It is doubtless that caring about something is necessary 
for a meaningful life. However, on the view we are considering, the contents to which the will 
is directed are not external (and accidental) to the intrinsic dispositions of the will.3 
3 In contrast with Frankfurt’s view, which locates the objects of love in the domain of the empirical self. 
 It is true that according to Frankfurt, such objects become independent of prudential considerations —that they 
are, as it were, transformed from intentional ends of practical rationality to necessities of the will— through the 
investment put by the self in them, so that they are tied to a formed self-conception. However, the very fact that 
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Two opposing conceptions of the will are, finally, cast in sharp relief. On the one hand, 
there is the Humean and Schopenhauerian view, according to which the will is a blind force 
that controls the decisions of intelligent agents. On this picture, the idea of an autonomous, 
rational power is delusive. On the other hand, the rationalist conceives the will as a power 
that —at its best— operates independent of empirical desires and motivations, as a rational 
disposition with its own ends. 
I now want to explore certain parallels between practical and epistemic agency. I 
assume that it is uncontroversial that the minimal requirements for agency are unchanged 
regardless of whether the goods at which the agent is aiming are prudential goods, such 
as health, or epistemic goods, such as forming true and reliable beliefs. This just means 
that agential epistemic performances are necessarily endeavours, which excludes from the 
domain of freedom acting out of blind, automatic inclinations, regardless of whether they 
are prejudices inculcated through cultural assimilation or seemings mechanically produced 
by natural endowments.
The resulting picture of epistemic agency is one in which the subject —far from being 
determined by seemings— determines himself to follow a seeming by intentionally aiming 
at an epistemic end. It is the acquisition of such an epistemic end that guides the agent in the 
process of assigning weights to different, sometimes conflicting, appearances, acting thus as 
a rule through which the deliverances of first-order cognitive competences are ranked and 
harmonized. On the plausible view that first-order competences are functionally directed at 
producing reliable seemings within the range of normal circumstances, it is natural to think 
that such a goal is also the purpose in the endeavour of which the agent determines himself 
to affirm. The agent’s reflective stance would thus help improve the reliability of first-order 
competences by subsuming them under a monitoring control. 
The first trouble for this minimal conception of epistemic agency comes from classical 
reliabilism, with its emphasis on the self-regulating character of our cognitive system as it is 
manifested in the blind production of resultant seemings through a sub-personal processing 
of a plurality of data. It is just not clear for the reliabilist why the monitoring agent is not 
redundant, or even obstructive to, the operation of this synthetic mechanism —how, under 
penalty of overdetermination, agency could be something other than a causally inefficacious 
epiphenomenon. Most importantly, issues are raised from the opposing camp. After all, on 
the present approach, the epistemic agent plays the part of functional mechanisms by taking 
their ends. So, it is again as if the blind teleology of our animal cognitive constitution were 
using agents as its vehicles.
The latter worry is forcefully displayed by Sosa in his analysis of guessing (Sosa, 2015, 
74-77). Sosa takes guesses to be epistemic performances in which the agent affirms p in the 
they are intrinsically local, to wit, that the unity of purpose that they provide to the agent is intended to guide 
one’s particular life, deprives those commitments of the normative force that we are attempting to capture. This 
would surely indicate that the conception of the will as a rational power and the view that its objects are such 
that the subject cannot help himself but act on them do not go together well. It is again as if a strong animal 
impulse were using the agent as its channel. This is why conceptions that make self-expression either a neces-
sary or a sufficient condition of freedom fall short.
 For Frankfurt’s views on this issue, see Frankfurt, 2006, 27-52. For a detailed critique of freedom conceived as 
self-expression, see Yaffe, 2000, 210-216. 
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endeavour of getting right on p. The agent is, therefore, guessing when he determines himself 
to affirm —and affirmations are a kind of action— with the aim of forming a true, reliable 
belief by so affirming. Sosa illustrates his point by considering the case of a subject who, 
in his eye exam, tries to give the right answer even after losing the confidence that he is 
getting the letters right and who unfailingly and reliably hits the target of truth.4 The agent’s 
performances are, by stipulation, reliable. Furthermore, the agent is not acting ‘blindly’ 
as a chicken sexer does —at the very least, he acts on purpose and follows the stronger 
appearance with the aim of getting a true answer. However, there is something missing in 
his performance, something that makes a mere guess of the affirmation, and so deprives it 
of a proper epistemic standing. Now, if we ask what is lacking here, our thoughts could be 
easily deceived by the trappings of the story.
On first consideration, the rub seems to lie in the subject’s lack of confidence. However, 
confidence is a psychological and phenomenological matter. As Sosa puts it, one could 
artificially gain a boost of confidence without thus increasing one’s epistemic standing (Sosa, 
2015, 76). In this sense, lack of confidence appears to be indicative of a deeper, fully epistemic 
phenomenon —the agent’s unwillingness to fully commit himself to his affirmation. 
On further reflection, it seems appealing to point to the circumstances of the performance 
to explain the nature of guessing. One could thus say that the very norms that define 
cognitive games such as game shows and eye exams are such that the epistemic resources 
the agent can access and the level of rational circumspection that he can rightly exercise are 
dramatically reduced. On this view, we have to take into account factors such as temporal 
limitations (urgency) and restricted goals (the objective of eye exams is just to determine 
one’s visual competence) to explain the lower standing of the subject’s performances. While 
action is guided by rational considerations, it is also impaired by the rules of the game. 
However, it is important to bear in mind two points regarding these particular contexts. 
For one thing, they are extenuating circumstances to which the agent can appeal to excuse his 
cognitive behaviour. By considering those cases, epistemic negligence is made explicit within 
exceptional contexts in which it is tolerated (or even required). In this sense, the circumstances 
serve as intimations of a widespread phenomenon. On the other hand, the epistemic deprivation 
and quantitative reduction of the information pertinent to knowable affirmation that is crucial 
in those scenarios is not a constitutive feature of guessing. At most, it is the habitual side-effect 
of the kind of negligence that defines guessing. Though it is true in many cases of guessing 
that the agent is ‘blind’ to further relevant information, there is nothing to prevent two agents 
from being on a par with regard to available information and acting on the same evidence 
while only one of them is guessing. Hence, it seems to follow that confidence, reliability, 
and rational affirmation, based on the same range of data that would be sufficient for proper 
judgment, are —all of them— compatible with guessing. What is then wrong with guessing?
The most obvious point to be made here is that it is the very purpose that guides the agent 
in such performances —to get it right— that constitutes guessing, regardless of whether the 
abovementioned factors are also present. Such purpose is a distorting influence that annuls and 
overrides the care for oneself as a cognitive agent responsive to reasons that is required for 
4 Sosa also considers as guesses the right answers of a game show contestant who is not sure whether such 
answers are right. For this example, see Sosa, 2015, 82. 
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knowable judgments. Maybe the evidence on which the guessing agent acts happens to align 
with the factors that epistemic agents would have to consider to avoid negligence. However, 
and so long as one’s goal trumps that of taking responsibility for one’s affirmations, one is —in 
a qualitative sense— blind to the duties that a proper care for rationality imposes on one’s 
actions. After all, if the evidence had been insufficient for moving the will to one’s commitment 
to one’s affirmations, the guessing agent would have affirmed nonetheless.
It is, therefore, as if full epistemic agency would require a higher purpose than that of 
tracking the truth. The agent also has to affirm in the endeavour of rationally affirming. 
His overarching goal is thus that of getting the truth by rationally affirming, where rational 
affirmation is embedded in the objective that the agent pursues. This is why, for Sosa, 
judgmental performances are directed at getting apt beliefs. 
It is clear that this higher purpose introduces a new end into nature and, in doing 
so, institutes a kind of normativity that goes well beyond the functional, and even the 
enhanced, reliability provided by monitoring control. Since this rational normativity 
governs knowable affirmations (judgments), knowledge, like morality, is attributable to 
only rational animals. Besides, judgments are on par with decisive actions in which the 
integrity of the rational self is at stake. It is by taking one’s claims seriously that one 
becomes a full agent, one who is bound to his affirmations by a proper care for his rational 
will and who relates to himself through his commitments.5 Guessing falls short because 
the prerequisites of knowledge are the agent’s non-negligent responsiveness to reasons 
and the corresponding self-determination, which explains why a successful guess does 
not serve to justify the guesser (the circumstances can, at most, excuse the guesser) and 
why the agent is not discredited even if his judgment is wrong, so long as he acted to the 
best of his powers. I think that it is precisely at this point where a disanalogy between 
practical and epistemic rationality should be noted. Whereas practical considerations in 
one’s interest serve to justify, and not only to excuse, one’s behaviour, to the point of being 
widely tolerated regardless of their moral neutrality, guessing is usually frowned upon by 
epistemic communities so that the guesser looks, at most, for extenuating reasons —and 
not for reasons that would vindicate his action as such. Thus, it seems as if the operation 
of a full rationality, however implicit, would be expected even from quotidian affirmations. 
This seems to expand our duties, though it does not lessen them.6 
5 The default expectation of such regard for rationality could plausibly explain why —absent reasons to the 
contrary—the speaker is entitled to be believed by the addressee so that “it is an insult and maybe an injury not 
to be believed.” (Anscombe, 1979, 150) The point is that the addressee owes respect to the speaker as a free, 
rational agent, one who is aiming not only to affirm correctly but also to affirm responsibly. One can always 
be held to account for one’s claims, but it is only in virtue of the fact that one is a rational, epistemic agent that 
one’s claims should be believed under penalty of epistemic injustice.
6 Alternatively, the gap between practical and theoretical reason could be bridged by appealing to different 
contexts of assessment. Thus, practical quotidian acts would be merely excused from the standpoint of moral-
ity while perfectly justified from a pragmatic perspective. In the same way, guessing is only excused in view 
of rational norms, but perfectly justified when other factors are dominant. Nonetheless, it still seems as if our 
expectations were usually higher in the domain of cognitive affirmation. Plausibly, those reasonable expecta-
tions are not only higher but also less influenced by circumstances regarding upbringing, education and person-
ality in the case of beliefs than in the case of actions. 
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The objective of making full agency explicit also sheds light on Sosa’s view on 
Pyrrhonism (Sosa, 2015, 229-232). According to his interpretation, the Pyrrhonians aimed 
at being epistemically governed by goals and policies that were freely determined by the 
will. To this end, they looked for reasons that by offsetting even the strongest inclinations 
to assent, would lead to a perfect balance of reasons in support of each alternative. Faced 
with such a state of rational indeterminacy, the agent is left simply at liberty to make his 
choice. Here, reasons do not determine the will’s outcome one way or the other. Thus, it 
depends solely upon the agent that something counts as a decisive reason for choice, and 
so, that the rational deadlock breaks. Inasmuch as the subject assigns the crucial weight to 
reasons and inclines the balance to a determinate state, he determines himself to act. It is, 
therefore, as if the Pyrrhonians worked themselves into a state of indetermination of the 
will in the endeavour of achieving full-fledged self-determination. This is why Sosa says 
that “the Pyrrhonian philosophy involves an existential stance.” (Sosa, 2015, 230) This also 
explains why the Pyrrhonian decision to be governed by the epistemic policy of following 
the guidance of nature and the rules of the community in his epistemic performances is, in 
Sosa’s view, perfectly rational. After all, Pyrrhonian choices are guided by reasons, at least in 
the sense that, with the reasons for and against a course of action cancelling each other, the 
agent is rationally determined to be a self-chooser —to act freely. The very fact that rational 
justification comes to an end serves, therefore, to justify one’s fundamental commitments. 
The trouble lies in two facts. For one, there is a deep difference between those fundamental 
practical questions for which the subject has to articulate his values through free choices 
and the overarching decision that the Pyrrhonian tackles, in that the former are inherently 
situational. This means that what is to be chosen in the first case is a personal form of life 
so that the choice is not directed to the norms that govern universal, rational behaviour. 
In contrast, the Pyrrhonian raises for himself the question of whether the agent can freely, 
rationally determine himself to follow the common conception of epistemic rationality. Thus, 
he works himself into the very limits of rational, self-reflective scrutiny. 
For another, the indirect way in which the Pyrrhonian decision to follow the guidance 
of nature can be considered rational raises the problem of arbitrariness. For, to say that the 
Pyrrhonian adopts common epistemic principles in a free and groundless way is to leave 
open the possibility that his decision is nothing other than arbitrary choice. Inasmuch as 
unguided choices are not free —they are merely random— it seems as if proper, rational 
self-determination would require more than the fact that it is rational to choose one way 
or the other. What is required is that there is only one rational choice to be made.7 This 
worry could also be expressed by noting that on this view the Pyrrhonian would be perfectly 
rational if opting for irrationality. It is the combination of these two issues that raises the 
question of the ultimate arbitrariness of rational normativity, whether practical or epistemic.
It seems as if we are threatened by an impasse of sorts. On the one hand, minimal agency 
is clearly insufficient for substantive rational determination, while on the other hand, full 
agency is being threatened by arbitrariness, as if agency in the fullest and substantive sense 
 This issue is, however, tangential to the main point that the normativity that rules over knowable affirmations is 
not animalistic. 
7 It is clear that the two requirements cancel each other so that for the choice to be rational, the agent cannot be 
left simply to make his choice.
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were unattainable. The difference between the two conceptions of agency developed in this 
section come to be, from a reflective perspective, of little consequence. The important point 
is that it appears as if we are trapped between animal compulsions and random choices. 
3. Epistemic Agency in its Fullest 
If the agent’s commitment to act by the guidance of reason is blind, the problem of 
rational self-determination that haunted us in the previous section returns with undiminished 
force. The question is whether one can still relate to oneself by one’s commitments in light 
of the ultimate arbitrariness of those substantial presuppositions that form the backbone of 
common epistemic rationality. 
The trouble lies in the fact that basic epistemic principles are evidential rules on which 
the whole game of weighing reasons for and against holding empirical beliefs depends. As 
such, they cannot be supported —or undermined— by any kind of evidence whatsoever: 
since no experience would have evidential force and direction if those basic principles 
were false, experience is epistemically neutral regarding those fundamental assumptions 
that make it epistemically indicative. Thus, it is just wrong to support the belief that we are 
not BIVs by appealing to empirical beliefs, the justification of which depends in turn on 
whether we are independently justified in taking ourselves not to be BIVs. One must then 
be rationally related to the principles of the agential perspective for a rational, integrative 
relation to empirical claims to even be possible. The Pyrrhonian challenge has to be met on 
its own terms: Would it be rational to opt out of common epistemic practices? What would be 
involved in such exercise of self-determination? What is at stake here is the very possibility 
of a full epistemic perspective, one that yields a positive, affirmative epistemic perspective 
on the epistemic perspective itself. 
It is at the end of Knowing Full Well where Sosa provides us with an a priori warrant 
for viewing the epistemic perspective as rationally justified (Sosa, 2011, 154-157). Sosa’s 
analysis takes the form of a transcendental argument that, shedding light on the conditions of 
possibility for ultimate, rational self-determination, concludes that there is only one rational 
choice to be made —the affirmation of common epistemic rationality. Sosa’s argument 
provides a negative justification of rationality by the rational deflation of Pyrrhonian 
indeterminacy. Unlike alternative strategies for self-validating rationality, what recommends 
Sosa’s transcendental argument for the present context is its formal, neutral character.
The main point of the argument is that if the principles of epistemic rationality were 
intrinsically deceptive —something that the Pyrrhonian entertains as a possibility—, then 
there would be no normative, rational attitude whatsoever to take regarding those principles 
—neither rational affirmation, nor negation, nor, as the Pyrrhonian recommends, suspension. 
Which leaves the agent with only one rational attitude to take on the question of whether to 
hold those principles —that of committing oneself to their truth. The agent is thus rationally 
determined to endorse rationality. 
Put in other words, agents cannot rationally believe that their rational norms are not 
efficacious and true without also rationally believing that when taking themselves to be 
rationally operating, they possibly are subject to a cognitive illusion. It is, however, clear 
that we cannot rationally believe that we might not be rational beings, on pain of making 
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of such meta-belief also an illusion. We are, therefore, rationally committed to rationality; 
the only epistemic perspective that one can take towards one’s epistemic perspective is that 
of rational affirmation; there is no way other than affirmation to be rationally related to the 
principles of epistemic rationality. As a result, the Pyrrhonian project of unbounding the 
willing and the rational nature of agents is paradoxical and self-refuting.8
From this it follows that because the agent can non-arbitrarily determine himself to 
follow the intentional purpose of affirming in the endeavour of getting the truth by rationally 
affirming, the reflective, full appropriation of the agent’s acts as his own is attainable. It is 
true that given its highly demanding and full meditative character, such substantive agency 
does not contribute to explaining the specific unity that the rational will, per se, confers 
to ordinary knowledge. However, such agency prevents reason from turning against itself 
and the consequent discrepancy between higher-order suspension and quotidian, rational 
affirmation. Such discrepancy would threaten neither the possession of knowledge nor the 
proper exercise of empirical rationality but —once the agent is made aware of it— would 
prevent him from responsibly attributing knowledge to himself and rationally claiming that 
p. This is why substantive, reclaimed agency is essential to avert cognitive disintegration 
—it provides the only kind of explicit relation to rationality that integrates empirical claims 
within the agent’s fullest rational self-conception. The self-assertion of reason prevents the 
agent from finding himself in the lap of faith —even if it is the faith in rationality. 
4. Coincidental Luck
 
Up to now, we have responded directly to the Pyrrhonian problematic. We have also 
explained why the agent’s proper care for his rationality is required for knowable affirmations 
that are not mere guesses. By themselves, these considerations are sufficient to show that 
personal agency has epistemic value, regardless of the extra-epistemic value such agency 
may also have. However, nothing has been said so far as to how agency contributes, if at all, 
to the mechanics of appropriate successful beliefs with regard to epistemic performances. 
The worry is that agency could easily account for the internalist, rational dimension of 
knowledge while being irrelevant from an externalist standpoint that restricts its attention to 
the production of beliefs that are linked to the truth by first-order competences. Could those 
functional mechanisms alone provide a complete causal explanation for the rightly successful 
epistemic performance, where a ‘complete explanation’ is one that does not leave open relevant 
aspects of the occurrence? Could they support the existence of adequately unified apt beliefs? 
The question is in which way apt beliefs —the explanans— can be causally explained without 
recurring to the purposes —implicit or explicit— of the epistemic agent.
One hard lesson to learn from the Gettier cases is that beliefs can be competently formed 
and true while falling short of knowledge. This happens, for example, in cases in which 
it is a perceptual competence that explains why the agent holds the belief that p, it also 
8 It goes without saying that the above argument would require further development to be compelling. However, 
its function within the current context is that of gesturing to the kind of strategy that, once expanded, would 
have a chance against radical scepticism. Besides, Sosa’s argument has the advantage of offering a purely for-
mal criterion on the basis of which the Pyrrhonian argument could be evaded. Notoriously, formal criteria are 
much more persuasive and easy to formulate than informal ones.
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happens that the belief is true, but the said competence —maybe because it is defective or 
malfunctioning— does not explain the success of the belief. In those cases, the success is 
fortuitous —even though the belief has been competently formed. Put another way, these 
are cases in which two different causal chains co-occur and jointly cause a true belief. The 
problem is that though the result is causally fully determined, it is also coincidental. An 
occurrence is coincidental, not because it is uncaused, but because it lacks a common cause 
for the causal sequences that bring about the result. Here, what explains the existence of the 
belief —visual competence— is unrelated to what explains its accuracy.
It was with the objective of providing a common cause for belief formation and belief 
success that Sosa substituted apt beliefs for competent, true beliefs as cognitively relevant.9 
Apt beliefs are such that not only the existence of the belief but also its success are due to 
the relevant competence. Thus, the question of why the agent holds the belief that p and the 
question of why this belief is successful are answered by pointing to the same factor. Apt 
beliefs are competently produced by a reliable virtue. But, is this enough?
The worry can be expressed as follows. Granted that S’s belief that p is apt, it is still true 
that S would have believed that p even if the competence were defective or malfunctioning. 
The truth of this counterfactual indicates that first-order aptness is not logically embedded 
in the conditions for competently holding beliefs so that it is false that S would hold that 
belief only if such belief were likely apt. It is, therefore, as if the same competence would 
explain the belief’s existence, on the one hand, and its aptness, on the other, in two different 
senses —as the causal basis on which the belief is formed and as a reliable virtue.
Let me dwell a little bit on this point. It is the fact that the competence is reliable that 
makes true that S would not too easily have so believed while his belief is inapt. This means 
that insofar as the belief is based on a reliable competence, if the belief is competently 
formed, it is also likely apt. Reliability automatically excludes the likely existence of inapt 
beliefs formed on such a basis. The problem lies in the fact that while the competence’s 
reliability explains why beliefs formed on the basis of the competence are likely apt, it 
does not explain why S came to believe so —after all, S does not determine himself to so 
believe because the belief would be likely apt; the belief could have been held, just as it 
is, in the absence of aptness. This is why the bare competence as the cause of believing 
and its reliability as the ground of aptness fall apart. Unlike what occurs in the Gettier 
cases, the belief’s success is not fortuitous. However, that the subject holds an apt belief is.
Aptness improves on mere success because when beliefs are apt, it is not by luck —on the 
contrary, it is by competence— that they are successful. However, even so, it is only by luck 
that S came to believe in a way that happens to be apt. There is no underwriting first-order 
reliability that would explain his believing in such a way that not only the success of the belief 
but its very existence would be apt. Provided that the agent does not hold the belief because 
of its likely aptness, it is just coincidental that he holds an apt belief —a belief which, of 
course, is not coincidentally successful. The agent does not aptly attain his apt belief, and so, 
the result, though causally determined, is contingently and externally brought about. The two 
causal lines combine, but they are not made for each other. What is then required is a common 
9 Sosa is most emphatic on this point in the Chapter 3, “Virtue, Luck and Credit”, of A Virtue Epistemology. See 
Sosa, 2007, 94-97.
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factor that precisely avoids the involvement of coincidence in belief formation/belief aptness 
relations. Such factor must be a second-order competence — one the reliability of which would 
underwrite the belief’s existence. It must also provide the internal relation between affirmation 
and aptness that a robust, non-coincidental unity of epistemic performances requires. This 
suggests, in turn, that we have to leave behind those beliefs understood as animal credences 
and implicit confidence and come to consider, in line with Sosa’s Cartesian view (Sosa, 2017, 
6-7), judgmental affirmations —those affirmations underwritten by agency. 
The point is that voluntary causes of apt performances are directed upon the occurrence 
of such events in such a way that it is the end at which the agent aims that explains the 
existence of the affirmation. The responsible agent intentionally determines himself to 
affirm in the endeavour of getting the truth by rationally affirming so that he would not have 
affirmed if his affirmation had not been likely apt. Since the agent would judge only if such 
judgment were likely apt, it is not by coincidental luck that he holds an apt judgment. The 
judgment is formed in the view of likely aptness. As such, the act of judging is underwritten 
by the same evaluative competence that is manifested in fully apt performances. 
There is just no way to pry apart rational competence as the ground for rightly successful 
judgments and as the causal basis of judgmental acts. As a matter of fact, here, one cannot 
coherently speak about causal bases at all because the act of judging has its source not in 
causes but in the very same reasons that explain why the judgment is apt. It is, therefore, the 
same aspect of the competence that the subject exercises if properly caring for the situation 
of his performance, his shape when performing and the standing of his cognitive abilities 
that explains why the agent aptly attains his apt beliefs and why he came to judge as he 
did. The agent rationally appropriates his affirmation and the first-order competence that 
produces apt performances —both of them become voluntary. Full aptness and judgment 
are made for each other. 
It is clearly possible that even a rational, responsible judgment could fall short of success. 
It is also possible that it could be successful just by luck. However, those possibilities do 
not loosen in the slightest the bond between judgment and full knowledge. It is still true that 
were the success due to the second-order competence, the explanation of why the success 
is not fortuitous would converge with the explanation as to why the agent formed that 
judgment. In those cases of epistemic accomplishment, the act of judging and the cognitive 
achievement of the agent would manifest the same rational competence. 
Provided that we can say, as we plausibly can, that coincidental luck can be avoided only 
if the subject affirms in the light of reasons and with the purpose of achieving rational, apt 
affirmation, it is clear that purely functional explanations of knowledge are inadequate. On the 
one hand, they are incomplete. After all, even if we had satisfied ourselves that we know all 
the mechanisms that resulted in S’s holding an apt belief, such explanation would still leave 
open the question of whether the resultant fact is coincidental or not. Given that such a fact 
would be left underdetermined by first-order explanations and that there is an intuitive factual 
distinction between S’s non-coincidental affirmation and the coincidental belief of his modal 
counterpart that the functional reconstruction alone cannot capture, the limitations of such 
procedure are obvious. On the other hand, functional explanations cannot explain knowledge 
because genuine knowledge requires the agent’s act of affirming not be merely contingently 
connected to success but to be connected in such a way that in the right circumstances, 
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affirming results in success. In normal circumstances, affirming must be internally related to 
successful performances so that it is fulfilled by a cognitive achievement that far from being 
an autonomous event, is the necessary development of the act of affirming itself. Deprived 
of such robust unity —one that only agency can provide— the agent is not creditable for his 
success in any meaningful sense, since such success is something that necessarily takes place 
outside his awareness and over which he has no control whatsoever. The agent’s competence 
in affirming is just the competence that the accuracy of his judgments fully displays. 
The unity of knowledge is thus grounded upon the rational will, which is necessary to 
solve the binding problem in epistemology at the three junctures at which it can occur: as the 
Pyrrhonian question of whether one can rationally endorse one’s epistemic rationality; as the 
problem of whether agency is nothing more than a monitoring control in the service of first-
order competences; and as the enquiry into the contribution of agency in the acquisition of 
quotidian knowledge. The rule of the rational will that operates within an epistemic perspective 
makes the agent’s cognitive integration possible by preventing arbitrariness, guessing and 
coincidental luck. It is thus much more than the epiphenomenal froth of standard reliabilism. 
As a matter of fact, the competences of the will look more like the headstone of the corner. 
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